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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PLC LANDSCAPE CONSTRUCTION,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.
12607

vs.

PICCADILLY FISH 'N CHIPS INC.

Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Weber County
C. DeMONT JUDD, JR.
521 Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah 84401

Attorney for Respondent
STRONG, POELMAN & FOX
Harold A. Hintze
700 El Paso Gas Building
315 East Second South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Appellant
I

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent is a landscape construction company
located at 1418 Wall Avenue, Ogden, Utah. Near the
time of completion of the construction of the defendant's
restaurant, defendant discussed with plaintiff the possibility of plaintiff providing the landscaping and exterior
design for the restaurant. Negotiations commenced between the respective parties wherein various designs and
their respective prices were discussed. The negotiations
yielded an agreement which provided that the defendant
pay the plaintiff the sum of $4581.30 and defendant must
supply plaintiff with some hand labor if plaintiff was to
complete the project for $4581.30. The defendant failed
to provide all of the hand labor necessary if the project
was to be completed on time. As a result it was necessary
for plaintiff to perform the work. After the landscaping
had been completed the respective parties met to adjust
the price previously agreed upon. Because of the additional labor involved, total price of work and materiah
furnished was $6669.53. Defendant thereafter paid
plaintiff the sum of $5500.00 but refused to pay an ad·
ditional $1169.53 which he owed the plaintiff for wort
and materials furnished. Upon defendant's refusal to
pay the additional amount due, plaintiff commenced an
action to recover the $1169.53.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This case was tried in Ogden on the 24th day al
June 1971, before the Honorable Calvin Gould, one ol
the judges of the Second Judicial District. At the con·
clusion of the plaintiff's case, the court took under ad·
visement defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
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said motion being based on the premise that plaintiff
had filed to establish a prima facie case, stating, "I will
take the motion under advisement. But at this point, Mr.
Hintze, it would appear to me that except for the actions
of your party, there was a contract. And it was their
failure to perform that put the case into a quantum
meruit type situation. If your parties had performed with
respect to labor, we would be dealing with a contract
case." On June 28, 1971, Judge Gould entered a Memorandum Decision finding the issues in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant with judgment against the
defendant in the sum of $1165.53, plus costs.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON

I. Court was correct in granting plaintiff judgment
and in failing to grant defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
A. Defendant seeks reversal on grounds that
court should have granted them Summary Judgment
because it failed to prove quantum meruit should be
denied.

B. Plaintiff proved that an express contract did
exist between the parties. Plaintiff's evidence established reasonable value of the materials and labor
provided.
C. Supreme Court has not reversed trial court
when sufficient evidence exists to support court's
ruling.
ARGUMENT

I. The court in its Memorandum Decision by grant-
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ing the plaintiff's judgment in effect ruled against the
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Court by its
ruling found sufficient evidence in the testimony by the
witnesses to grant plaintiff's judgment.
A. Defendant's reversal on the grounds that
the court should have granted them Summary Judgment because plaintiff failed to prove quantum
meruit should be denied.
Rule 15 (b) of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
states: "When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried
by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings; such amendment of the pleadings as may be
necessary to cause to conform to the evidence and to
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is
not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court
may allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court
that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him
in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits.
The court shall grant a continuance,if necessary, to enable the objecting part to meet such evidence."
Rule 15(b) clearly states that the plaintiff's election
to proceed under a theory of express contract rather than
a quantum meruit was the proper approach to take since
it enabled them to make their pleadings conform more
precisely to the evidence.
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In Jackson v. Cope, 266 P 2d 500, I Utah 2d 330,
(54) the court stated; "Where plaintiff's amendment
to pre trial order was made to conform to evidence and
new issue introduced thereby was such as could be' conveniently and effectively handled in trial without injury
to substative rights, and defendants did not claim that
they had been surprised by the evidence or had not been
given an opportunity to meet it, amendment of pre-trial
order was clearly in futherance of justice." In the case at
hand this is clearly the circumstances which exist. Plaintiff proceeds in the manner which made his initial pleadings more concisely conform to the evidence. Further
more, the defendant makes no objection to the Findings
of Fact. In failing to take issue with the trial court's findings of fact, the defendant in effect acknowledges that
they were not surprised by the evidence. As a result, we
can only conclude that the procedure taken by the plaintiff was clearly in futherance of justice.
B. Plaintiff proved that an express contract
existed between the parties and plaintiff's evidence
established reasonable value of the materials and
labor provided.
The court in its Memorandum Decision determined,
"that it couldn't reconcile the testimony of the witnesses
and determined the testimony of Mr. Dale Cook to be
lucid and concise." Mr. Cook's background and record
includes the following:
1. He is now employed by Research Homes.
2. Prior to this he was employed by PLC
Landscape Construction full time for six years and
part time for two years.
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3. During the period he was employed by PLC
he worked on construction crews until he eventually
became a supervisor. He also did some designing as
a Landscape Architect, made estimates and made
some client contracts.

The
lines the
the work
the fact
parties.

testimony of the witness Dale Cook clearly outreasonable value of the materials supplied and
performed. Mr. Cook's testimony also points out
that an express contract existed between the

Mr. Cook had several contracts with Piccadilly's
principal, Gary Smith, in which they discussed what design the defendant was interested in and relative costs.

Q. What was your estimate when you first
went and talked to him about the plan and estimate?
A. It was Seven Thousand Three Hundred and
something.

Q. Now when you presented the $7,413.00
estimate to him, you also presented a detailed blueprint, is that correct?

A. Yes.
After this initi'al estimate was made, further negotiatfons were necessary for the parties to reach a final
agreement.

Q. At this point was there negotiation with
respect to the ultimate price?
A. He told me when he saw the first price, "!
can't spend that much . . . . . . I think I can spend
$4,500.00"
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Q. And did you come back with a revised bid?
A. I went back to the office and proceeded to
find a way to cut it down to $4,500.00. And as is the
case usually when the client wants to cut it down,
(he) wants to do some of the labor himself, we take
out as much of the labor as we feel a layman can do
competently with our supervision."

In addition to the defendant providing some hand
labor, other changes were made including "cutting out
some of the concrete work: and "the use of planting lawn
with seed rather than using pre-grown sod, which is more
. "
expensive.

Q. So what was your final agreement with respect to the amount of net total bid that you would
do the job for?
A. Now as I called him on the phone and we
talked about it to tell him that we could get it down,
I told him that we found we would do these things.
I hold him on the phone what they were. If we could
do that, then we could put the job as was talked
about for $4,581.30.

Q. Now after, on the telephone, you agreed to

do it for $4,581.30. Did you receive authorization
to go forward?
A. He said, "Yes, let's get started on it ...... "

As a result of the negotiations and the agreements
which were made between the parties, one must conclude
that an expressed contract did exist between the parties,
as the trial court found.
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From the time of the agreement by the parties to
have the job performed for $4,581.30, due to the defen.
dant's failure to perform, the plaintiff was required to
supply additional labor and material whos reasonable
value resulted in a final bill of $6,669.53.
Defendant failed to do the labor which he had
agreed to do and for which the original bid was lowered.

Q. After you began the work . . . . were there
any changes made?
A. . . . . We started getting ready to a point
where the labor he (defendant) was going to do
hadn't been done, and it was almost to start holding
us up .... I believe I talked with defendants occa·
sionally, two or three times, I can't remember for
sure. And he would say, well we have got to get it
done, so you guys go ahead and we will work this
out later.

Q. So that (fence) was taken out initially and
put back in?
A. Yes.

Q. So that the $4,581.30 bid was increased by
some labor and by a fence, is that correct?
A. Yes, it was.

Q. And were there any other increases?
A. Yes, there were ..... There were some con·
crete caps that we put on some of the brick ':a~!
around the front which was agreed upon to get it
done.
Q.

Did you submit a final bill?
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A. Yes, we did. I got a first down payme!lt right
after we had started and a midway payment in the
middle. And I kind of went over the cost of things a
little bit then. I warned him that it was coming right
back up to where the original bid was again because
we were having to do all the labor that was supposedly taken out. And he said: "Well, we have got
to get it done, you know, and we can't do it, so we
will work it out as the final billing comes." And at
the final billing I went over the whole job and showed him what happened . . . . . . .
The trial court in "determining the testimony of
Dale Cook to be lucid and concise," concluded from the
evidence supplied by his testimony that the reasonable
value of the additional materials and labor supplied by
the plaintiff did in fact result in a final cost of $6,669.53.

E. The Supreme Court has not reversed the trial
court when sufficient evidence exists to support the
court's ruling.

It is clear from the court's Memorandum Decision
that the testimony of Dale Cook provided it with sufficient evidence to determine that the defendant should
pay the plaintiff the full amount of the final bill submitted.
In Leen Glazier and Sons, Inc. v Larsen, 491 P 2d
266 (Utah 1971), the court stated that "On appeal from
judgments of no cause of action in action at law, Supreme
Court would not review evidence or attempt to substitute
its judgment for that of trial court." It was further stated
that, "If there is substantial evidence to support judgment of court below in action at law, Supreme Court will
affirm."
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Also in First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons and Reed
Co., 492 P 2d, 132 (Utah 1971) the Court declared that
"It will on appeal survey the evidence in a light favorabl~
to trial court's findings."
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff was not required to proceed under a
quantum meruit procedure because of Rule 15(d) of the
Utah Code Annotated and because the Supreme Court
has ruled in similar situations that amendment to the
pre-trial order was in the furtherance of justice. And the
plaintiff as indicated in the testimony of the witness,
Dale Cook, which was accepted by the trial court, did
prove the performance of work and the reasonable value
thereof. As a result of the conclusions, the case should
be upheld and judgment granted to the plaintiff.
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